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Abstract—In this paper, we point out the use of secret sharing
strategies as a promising solution for managing the key distribu-
tion and recovery in the Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID)-
enabled supply chains. To this end, we designed a new model
based on a secret sharing approach to solve the key distribution
issue within the supply chains. We further proposed a secret
key update protocol incorporating a resynchronisation capability
to counter the disruptive effects of location tracking, replay
attacks, and desynchronisation attacks. Compared with relevant
approaches, our work demonstrates a number of advantages in
terms of security and performance.
Index Terms—RFID; key management; secret sharing;
I. INTRODUCTION
RFID is a wireless technology that uses radio signals to
identify objects [1]. RFID is composed of three main com-
ponents, namely a tag, a reader and a back-end server. The
reader broadcasts a radio frequency (RF) signal to power and
communicate with RFID tags without any physical contact;
the RFID tag is attached to an item and transmits the stored
information to nearby reader through the RF channel. The
reader sends the tag’s data to the backend server, which in
turn stores data about the RFID tags it manages.
In this paper, we focus on the supply chain management,
where thousands or millions of inbound and outbound products
move from the manufacturer to the customers. These products
should be correctly identified, verified and sorted at different
points in the supply chain. Normally, there are three main
parties within the supply chain: the manufacturer, the distrib-
utor centers (DC) and the retailer stores. The manufacturer
dispatches the cases to different distributors who then send
the products to the retailer stores, and in some instances the
distributor may dispatch the cases to other distributor as shown
in Fig. 1. We use the term “case” as the generic term for a
collection of goods and the term “good” for the product itself.
Fig. 1. Supply chain parties
RFID has captured the attention of many leading supply
chain companies to make this technology feasible. The RFID
technology enables the supply chain to identify, track and
verify the products automatically and in real time. By using the
RFID technology, all the parties has to store the products’ data
in their database. The database and the product’s tag should
share a secret key for protecting the data during transmission.
Thus, the secret key should be distributed among all the parties
involved in the supply chain.
Basically, a secret key distribution must rely on secure
channels established through pre-existing trust relationships.
However, in supply chain practice, especially for ad hoc supply
chain structures, there is often a lack of trust between the
parties involved, as the products’ owner may not know the
next owner [2]. Moreover, the wireless channel between the
reader and tags is vulnerable to possible attacks such as replay
attacks, Denial of Service attacks (DoS), counterfeiting attacks
and location tracking [3].
One solution to secure the communication channel is to
encrypt the exchanged data with a secret key. Yet, the question
remains regarding how to keep the secret key uncompromised.
Research has been done concerning the possibility of dis-
tributing the secret key securely in the RFID supply chain
via deploying the secret sharing approach.
Adi Shamir [4] proposed a secret sharing approach, where
a secret can be divided into (n) parts that, individually, do not
render any useful information about the secret. To reconstruct
the secret, not all the parts are needed, any (k) of the parts
are sufficient to reconstruct the original secret. This scheme is
called a (k, n) threshold scheme.
The main contribution of this paper include:
1) A proposal has been introduced in [5], where the authors
proposed to distribute one secret key securely among
the supply chain parties by using a secret key sharing
approach. Their model assumes that the distributor area
is secure as the adversaries have no access. The reader
can refer to Section III-A for more details.
However, in this paper, unlike Jules et al. assumption
that the distributer centers are secure, we assume that
any place outside the manufacturing area is insecure,
thus we designed a protocol for protecting the tags’
data outside the manufacturing area. Beside that, we
improve their model by generating two secret keys, one
key for the cases that hold the products and the other
key is for the products’ tags. Hence, facilitating the cases
identification for the distributer as it needs to read the
cases’ tags only not all the products’ tags.
2) Cai et al. [6] found that Jules et al. model [5] is
vulnerable to location tracking and counterfeiting attack.
Thus, they designed a protocol for updating the secret
key after recovering enough shares and authenticating
the tags successfully. Therefore, the tag will respond
with new data. The reader is referred to Section III-B for
more details. However, we discovered that an attacker
can desynchronise a tag without even compromising the
internal data stored in the tag. As as result, the attacker
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will be able to track the location of the tag and render the
tag unusable in the next session. Hence, in this paper, we
propose a new secret key update protocol in the RFID-
enabled supply chains to prevent such attacks.
The operational environment of the proposed model is
shown in Table I. In Table I, we assume that there are
two distributors for clarification but it can be more.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section
II lists the main goals of the proposed scheme. Section III
summarises the main related work to key distribution in the
RFID-enabled supply chain. In Section IV we explain the
proposed scheme in detail. Section V is an analysis of our
proposed scheme against the stated security requirements.
Section VI discusses the parameterization issues. Finally,
Section VII provides the concluding remarks.
II. THE MAIN REQUIREMENTS AND GOALS
The proposed model should meet the following require-
ments and goals:
• Privacy: The designed scheme must achieve two impor-
tant notions related to privacy namely:
– Tag information privacy: RFID tags should provide
a mechanism for preventing the tag information
from being revealed by any malicious reader. For
example, encrypting the tag’s reply will only allow
an authorised reader to decrypt it.
– Untraceability: If the data being sent from the tag to
the reader is static or linked to data sent previously,
the tag’s holder location can be tracked without his
knowledge. Therefore, the RFID tag’s data should be
anonymous and unlinkable.
• Security: The designed protocol should resist the follow-
ing attacks:
– Replay attack: The adversary can eavesdrop on the
communication between a reader and tag, reuse the
data and send it repeatedly.
– Desynchronisation attack: The adversary can eaves-
drop on the communication between a reader and tag,
and prevent messages from reaching their target, thus
causing a desynchronisation attack.
– Tag and reader impersonation attack: The attacker
sends a message to the reader that claims to come
from a legitimate tag, and this message fabrication
enables the attacker to masquerade as a legitimate
tag. The same applies to the reader impersonation.
– Secret key secrecy: We require that the adversary
cannot recover the secret key unless he can get access
to at least (k) shares..
• Mutual authentication: The scheme should provide a
mutual entity authentication, where the communication
should take place between valid tags and readers and
provide assurance to the receiver (reader) about the
identity of the sender (tag) and vice versa.
• Flexibility: The proposed model should allow all the
participants in the supply chain to change the threshold
parameters to process the cases and goods that have been
divided into smaller or larger quantities.
III. RELATED WORK
Most of the proposed privacy enhanced RFID mutual au-
thentication protocols such as [3], [14]–[18] are based on
storing the secret key used for authentication in a database.
This may fail on delivering the secret key to the correct parties
especially when a large scale of RFID tags move along ad hoc
supply chains.
A practical solution to the key distribution problem is the
secret sharing approach. Some research have been proposed to
distribute the secret key securely based on the notion of secret
key sharing [2], [5]–[7].
To begin, Langheinrich et al. [7] proposed the “Shamir
tag”, which is the first proposal based on using secret sharing
approach in the RFID systems to protect the transmission of
the tag’s ID. This approach splits the ID of a tag into multiple
shares based on Shamir secret sharing scheme [4], and stores
all the shares on the tag itself. These shares are concatenated
to form the new ID of a tag. Upon a reader’s inquiry, an initial
set of random bits from the new ID is released, followed by
subsequent throttled single-bit releases. Once the entire new
ID is released, the reader can compute the original ID. In this
scheme, an RFID reader requires several minutes to recover
the ID, which is not practical in the supply chain, where a
large number of tags need to be processed [6].
Li et al. [2] proposed a new scheme called “Resilient Secret
Sharing (RSS)”. In this paper, the authors designed a secure
and practical key distribution system between three parties (A,
B, C) in the supply chain. Each tag stores two shares; one
share belongs to the secret key (x) between A and B, and the
other share is intended for the secret key (y) between A and
C. The secret key (x) is divided into multiple shares that are
stored in (r) tags, and the remaining shares (n-k-r) are stored
in the database, where n is the number of shares, and k is
the number of shares required to reconstruct the secret key.
The same process is done on the secret key (y). Although
this scheme is secure, the key shares are still distributed to a
database, which does not solve the key distribution problem.
In this paper we focus on two research papers [5] and [6] as
they are relevant to our main goals. These papers are discussed
further in the following section.
A. Review of Jules et al. unidirectional RFID key distribution
In [5], the author proposed a secret key sharing approach to
be used within the RFID-enabled supply chain to protect the
transmission of the tag’s ID. This approach does not require
any computations on the tag side, the tag just stores two values
and sends them to the reader.
The authors suggested the following:
• A group of tags share one secret key (K).
• Using a threshold scheme (k, n) where k ≤ n, the secret
key is divided into (n) shares, only (k) shares are needed
to reconstruct the secret key.
• The ith tag Ti stores two values namely share (Si) and a
symmetrically encrypted information (EK(EPCi)), where
the Electronic Product Code (EPC) [8] is a universal
identifier that provides a unique identity to every tag.
• Each ith good’s tag sends (Si, EK (EPCi)) to any dis-
tributer/retailer reader who queries it.
• When the reader receives k shares from the goods’tags,
it recovers the secret key and obtains the EPC value for
each tag.
The authors claim that their protocol is secure due to the
following reasons:
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TABLE I
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
Responsibility Aim
Manufacturer
1- Use two types of RFID tags. A tag attached to each case that holds
the products, and a tag attached to each product in the case.
Facilitate the cases identification process within the dis-
tributer center.
2- Generate two secret keys, one key is for the cases that hold the
products and the other key is for the products’ tags, and divide them
into multiple shares.
Encrypt the tags’ unique IDs and protect the tag’s identity
from being revealed.
3- Specify the secret key threshold to recover the secret keys.
4- Assign one share of the cases’ secret key to each case’s tag along
with the encrypted tag’s ID and any other values.
5- Assign one share of the products’ secret key to each product’s tag
along with the encrypted tag’s ID and any other values.
6- Lock all the products’ tags with different PINs. Protect the goods’ tags from revealing their data to any
entity.
Distributer 1 Stage 1:Read all the cases’ tags and collect enough shares to recover the cases’
secret key.
Authenticate the cases’ tags.
Stage 2:
1- Update the secret key and generate new shares. 1- Distribute the cases to downstream distributer(s) with
new secret key threshold.
2- Resist replay attack, desynchronisation attack and
impersonation attack.
2- Dispatch the products to the next distributer.
Distributer 2 1- Read all the cases’ tags and collect enough shares to recover the
cases’ secret key.
Authenticate the cases’ tags.
2- Dispatch the products to the retailer.
Retailer 1- Retrieve a list of PINs (from step 6 above) associated to eachproduct’s tag from the manufacturer.
Allow the retailer’s reader to unlock the tag.
2- Unlock the tags.
3- Read all the products tags and collect enough shares to recover the
products’ secret key.
Authenticate the products’ tags.
• This scheme provides an efficient solution for a tag
ownership transfer, as there is no need to distribute the
secret key in the supply chain databases.
• The adversary will not be able to recover the secret key
when he obtains the two values (Si, (EK (EPCi))) from a
customer’s tag as he needs to collect k shares to recover
the secret key.
• The authors assumed that the manufacturer and distributer
centers are secure where the adversary does not have
access, only the legitimate parties can collect k shares.
Cai et al. [6] shows that the tag’s response can be tracked as
(Si, EK(EPCi)) are fixed and sent to any reader who queries
it. Also, an adversary can obtain the fixed tag’s reply, and thus
he is able to counterfeit the tag.
In addition, from our point of view, it is inefficient for the
distributer to scan all the goods’ tags to find the secret key.
The distributor’s concern is to make sure that all the cases
containing goods are delivered safely.
B. Review of Cai et al. secret key update protocol
Cai et al. [6] proposed an enhanced protocol for Jules et al.
scheme [5] to avoid tag tracking and counterfeiting attacks.
They presented a protocol for updating the secret key (K) and
shares (S) after recovering the secret key and authenticating
the tag successfully, thus the tag will respond with new values.
The authors proposed to store a new data called (c) to serve
as a secret value and to authenticate the reader before updating
the data. This value is stored in the tag i.e. ci=h(K ‖ Si),
where (h) is a hash function, h:{0,1}∗→ {0,1}L, and L is the
security parameter. The tag responds to the reader query with
three values namely (Si, ci, Mi), where Mi=EK (EPCi).
During manufacturing, the manufacturer assigns the initial
data (Si, ci, Mi) to the tag. The protocol uses simple cryp-
tographic functions such as hash function, XOR operator (⊕)
and concatenation operator (‖). A ← B means that the value
of A is updated to that of B.
The protocol in [6] is described as follows:
• Tag → Reader: The tag Ti sends (Si, ci, M) to the reader.
• Reader: After receiving k shares and recovering the secret
key, the reader calculates ci=h(K ‖ Si) to find a match
with the received ci, if there is a match, it authenticates
the tag.
• Reader: If the reader successfully authenticated the tag
Ti, the reader generates a new secret key K′, divides it
into (n) new shares, calculates Mi′ and generates a new
threshold(k′, n′).
• Reader: For the ith tag Ti, the reader calculates:
– ci
′
=h(K′ ‖ Si′)
– A=(Si′ ‖ Mi′) ⊕ h(’0’ ‖ ci)
– B=ci′ ⊕ h(1 ‖ ci)
– C=h(ci ‖ Si′ ‖ Mi′ ‖ ci′)
• Reader → Tag: The reader sends (A,B,C) to Ti.
• Tag: After receiving (A,B,C) from the reader, Ti com-
putes:
– (Si′ ‖ Mi′)=A ⊕ h(’0’ ‖ ci)
– ci
′
=B ⊕ h(1 ‖ ci)
If C=hash(ci ‖ Si′ ‖Mi′ ‖ ci′), the reader is authenticated.
Then Ti updates its values to:
– Si ← Si′
– Mi ← Mi′
– ci ← ci
′
Cai et al. claim that their protocol is immune against
location tracking, as the tag data are updated after a successful
key recovery process. Thus, the tag will reply with new data
every time the reader queries it. However, we deduce three
attacks over their protocol namely desynchronisation attack,
location tracking, and failure tag authentication. The attacks
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work as follows:
1) Desynchronisation attack:
Cai et al. protocol does not provide resistance to desyn-
chronisation attack. An adversary can easily cause a syn-
chronisation failure by intercepting the communication
between the reader and the tag. If the reader’s messages
sent to x tags, where x < k, are blocked, the next owner’s
reader will not be able to recover the new secret key and
complete the authentication, causing a desynchronisation
attack.
2) Location tracking:
Since the tag does not receive any data from the reader as
a result of a desynchronisation attack, it will reply with
the same data (Si, ci, Mi) for every query it receives,
and hence permits location tracking.
3) Authentication failure:
The reader will not authenticate the compromised tag
anymore due to desynchronising the tag’s data, hence
rendering the tag unusable.
IV. A KEY DISTRIBUTION IN AN RFID-ENABLED SUPPLY
CHAINS SCHEME
In order to solve the security and flexibility problems
found in previous works [2], [5]–[7] while maintaining their
merits, we propose a flexible and secure key management and
recovery model as an enhancement of the Jules et al. model
and Cai et al. secret key update protocol. The details of our
work are illustrated below.
A. Our approach
The proposed scheme is described below:
1) Manufacturer initialisation process:
The main goal of this process is to protect the secret keys
namely (KC and KT ) from being revealed during the transmis-
sion to the next owner. The manufacturer does the following:
1) The manufacturer generates two random numbers (R1
and R2).
2) The manufacturer calculates KC=h(R1) and KT =h(R2)
where h is a one-way hash function. KC is the secret
key for the cases and KT is the secret key for the goods.
3) The manufacturer splits KC into n shares and stores one
share (Si) in the ith case’s tag memory. Similarly, KT is
divided into n′ shares, where each share (Si′) is stored
in the ith good’s tag memory, as shown in Fig. 2.
4) The manufacturer specifies the threshold (k, n) for
recovering (KC) secret key and (k′, n′) for recovering
(KT ) secret key. We assume that the number of shares (k,
k′) is large enough to prevent the attacker from reading
k or k′ shares.
5) For each tag Ti in the cases, the manufacturer computes
Ci=h(KC ⊕ Si) and stores Ci in the case tag’s memory
for authenticity purpose.
6) To ensure privacy of the tag’s data, such as EPC during
transmission, the manufacturer encrypts each case tag’s
EPC value and stores it in the tag’s memory, i.e. EPC-
Casei=EKC{EPCi}, and similarly encrypts the EPC
value of each good’s tag and stores it in the tag’s
memory, i.e. EPC-Tagi=EKT {EPCi}, where EKC and
EKT represent a symmetric key encryption using KC
and KT , respectively.
7) The manufacturer locks only the goods’ tags with an
access-PIN, thus the tag will only send its data to the
intended retailer(s) if it receives the correct access-PIN.
8) The manufacturer puts the goods inside the cases and
then sends these cases to the next distributer.
2) Distributor key recovery:
In this section we discuss the key recovery process when all the
cases reach the distributor. The distributor uses the threshold
scheme to recover the secret key (KC), decrypt the encoded-
EPC (EPC-Casen) and obtain the EPC values.
• When the distributor ensures that all the expected cases
have arrived, the reader scans the cases’ tags.
• Each tag sends (Si, Ci, EPC-Casei) to the reader.
• The reader collects k shares to obtain the secret key (KC).
• The reader decrypts EPC-Case for each case’s tag using
the recovered secret key (KC) to retrieve the EPC value.
• The reader re-calculates Ci=h(KC ⊕ Si) for every cases’
tags to authenticate the cases. If there is a match, the
distributer looks for the next owner:
– If the next owner is another distributor the secret
key update process is performed as shown in Section
IV.A.3.
– In case that the next owner is a retailer, the
distributor updates the threshold of the goods’ tags
(knew′, nnew ′) to fit the new dispatched items as
shown in Section IV.A.4. In addition, the distributor
should destroy the cases’ tags as they will not be
used anymore; hence avoid tampering or tracking
the cases’ tags.
3) Distributer secret key update process:
This process occurs only if the next owner of the RFID tags
is another distributor. The main goals of updating the secret
key and the threshold are to prevent location tracking and
counterfeiting attacks. If KC , Si and EPC-Casei are fixed, the
attacker will be able to trace the location of the tag and/or
obtain such data to counterfeit a legitimate tag. The secret
key update process and resynchronisation process is shown in
Table II.
• Distributor key initialisation process:
Once the reader recovered the secret key, and obtained
EPCi for a specific tag Ti, it does the following:
1) The reader generates a random number (R).
2) The reader calculates KC ′=h(R). KC ′ is the new
secret key for the cases.
3) For each tag, the reader computes EPC-
Case2i=EKC ′{EPCi} for the ith tag in the
system.
4) The reader divides KC ′ into n new shares (Sn′).
5) The reader specifies the new threshold parameters
(knew, nnew) for recovering (KC ').
6) The reader calculates Ci′=h( KC ′ ⊕ Si′).
7) To distribute the new values of Si′, and Ci′ securely
for the ith tag, the reader does as follows:
– Generates a random number R1.
– Calculates M1= h(EPCi ⊕ EPC-Case2i ⊕ R1 ⊕
Ci) ⊕ Si′.
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Fig. 2. Key splitting process
– Calculates M2= h(Si′ ⊕ EPCi ⊕ R1) ⊕ Ci′.
– Sends M1, M2, EPC-Case2i and R1 to the tag.
8) When the tag receives the messages, it obtains Si′
and Ci′ by calculating:
Si′= M1 ⊕ h(EPCi ⊕ EPC-Case2i ⊕ R1 ⊕ Ci)
Ci′= M2 ⊕ h(Si′ ⊕ EPCi ⊕ R1)
Now, the tag guarantees that the reader has success-
fully recovered the secret key, decrypted EPC-Casei
and obtained EPCi. The tag updates its values to:
Si ← Si′
EPC-Casei ← EPC-Case2i
Ci ← Ci′
9) To inform the reader that the tag has received the
new data, it does the following operations:
– The tag generates a random number R2.
– The tag calculates M3= H(EPCi ⊕ Si ⊕ Ci ⊕ R1
⊕ R2), where Si and Ci are the updated values,
and sends M3 to the reader, along with R2.
10) The reader then recalculates M3. If there is a match,
the reader guarantees that the tag has updated its
values successfully.
11) The distributor dispatches the cases to the next dis-
tributor. However, if the reader did not receive M3
from the tag, the reader starts the resynchronisation
process as shown in the next section.
• Resynchronisation process:
If the reader did not receive M3 from the tag, then the
reader does the following:
1) To re-distribute (Si′, Ci′) securely for the ith tag,
the reader does as follows:
– Generates a new random number (R3).
– Computes M4= h(EPCi ⊕ EPC-Case2i ⊕ R3) ⊕
Si′.
– Computes M5= h(Si′ ⊕ EPCi ⊕ R3) ⊕ Ci′.
– Sends a resynchronization request with M4, M5,
EPC-Case2i and R3 to the tag.
2) When the tag receives a resynchronisation request,
M4, M5, EPC-Case2 and R3, it re-computes M4
and M5 as in step 8 above.
a) If the received values of Si′, EPC-Case2 and Ci′
are equal to the current values, the tag assumes
that M3 did not reach the reader and keeps the
values the same without update.
b) If the received values of Si′, EPC-Case2 and Ci′
are not equal to the current values of Si, EPC-
Case and Ci, the tag updates its values to:
Si ← Si′
EPC-Casei ← EPC-Case2i
Ci ← Ci′
3) The tag generates a random number R4.
4) The tag calculates M6= H(EPCi ⊕ Si ⊕ Ci ⊕ R3
⊕ R4) and sends it to the reader along with R4 to
inform the reader that it received the new values.
The process is iterated until the reader assures that
the tag has updated its values.
5) The distributor dispatches the cases to the next
distributor.
4) Retailer key recovery process:
At this stage, the retailer wants to authenticate all the goods’
tags and retrieve their EPC values. The reader needs to unlock
the tag first and then recover the secret key KT to obtain the
EPC values form the tags.
The good’s tag data is both read and write locked so
everyone cannot read or modify the tag’s data, but only the
legitimate reader with the correct access-PIN. We assume
that the retailer contacts the manufacturer to retrieve a list
of the access-PIN values attached with the tag’s sequence
number to unlock the tag, and stores them in a database.
The authentication and authorisation between the retailer and
manufacturer is beyond the scope of this paper.
The purpose of locking the tag is to prevent it from sending
the values of Si and EPC-Tagi to any reader query, which in
turn permits location tracking and impersonation attacks. Thus,
in order to obtain the tag’s data, the reader has to have the
correct access-PIN.
The retailer key recovery process is shown in Table III and
summerised below:
• To unlock the tag, the reader sends a random number R1
to the tag as a challenge. The tag responses with another
random number R2 and the tag’s sequence number.
• The reader retrieves the access-PIN based on the re-
ceived sequence number from the database, and calculates
PIN=h(R1 ⊕ R2 ⊕ access-PIN), and sends PIN to the tag.
• The tag re-calculates PIN. If the received PIN is correct,
the tag calculates M1= h(access-PIN ⊕ R1) ⊕ Si and
sends it to the reader along with EPC-Tagi.
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• The reader re-calculates M1 ⊕ h(access-PIN ⊕ R1) to
obtain Si. After unlocking all the tags, the reader collects
k' shares to recover KT .
• Finally, the reader decrypts EPC-Tagi based on the re-
covered KT and retrieves EPCi for every ith tag.
V. ANALYSIS
The proposed model also provides protection against the
following attacks:
• Reader impersonation attack: An attacker may attempt
to generate a fake random number and send it with the
messages (M1, M2, EPC-Case2i) to the tag in order
to modify the tag with incorrect values. However, the
attacker cannot calculate M1 and M2, as they involve a
secret value namely (EPCi), which is 144 bits length, that
is only known to the tag and legitimate reader. Moreover,
the attacker cannot impersonate a retailer reader as he
needs first to be authenticated by the manufacturer to
retrieve a list of access-PINs.
• Tag impersonation attack: The attacker cannot send M3
on behalf of the tag to the reader, as it involves three
secret values unknown to the attacker (EPCi, Si, Ci) and
it is a result of a one-way hash function that is pre-image
resistant.
The attacker cannot impersonate a good’s tag once he
obtained M1,and EPC-Tagi from a previous compromised
session as he needs to know the access-PIN value to
accomplish such attack.
• Desynchronisation attack: The new secret update protocol
addresses the realistic scenario, where messages might
not reach their intended recipient due to accidental or
malicious interference. The following scenario needs to
be considered:
– If the reader does not receive M3 from the tag
within a specific timeout, the reader will assume
that the tag did not receive M1 and M2, or M3 was
lost during transmission, so the reader will start the
resynchronisation process and send M4, M5, EPC-
Case2 and R3. Similarly, if the resynchronisation
messages are blocked or M6 was lost, after timeout
the reader will restart the resynchronisation process.
Eventually, when the jamming stops, the tag and reader
will resynchronise and will be able to authenticate each
other. In summary, as long as the desynchronise attack is
not continuous, the tag and reader will eventually be able
to synchronise. All the attacker can gain by jamming the
messages is to delay the synchronisation process.
• Tag information privacy: The aim of the proposed model
is to protect the identity of the tags (EPC). The value of
the EPC is protected via encrypting it with a secret key.
This key is not openly distributed and is not stored in the
participants’ database. Also, the tag does not maintain
the secret key in its memory. Hence, the attacker cannot
obtain the value of EPC unless he collects k shares. It
will take up to (2144) attempts to guess the EPC value,
which is conceptually strong. Moreover, the access-PIN
is not sent in clear, it is protected via the hash function.
• Untraceability: The tag’s secret key KC , S, EPC-Case
and C values are updated after each successful key
recovery process, so the tag’s responses will be different
for every reader query. Hence, the attacker cannot track
the tag’s location.
Resynchronisation process plays an important role in
preventing location tracking as the reader keeps resending
the new updated data until it confirms that the tag has
successfully changed its data.
Furthermore, the attacker will not be able to track the
good’s tag purchased by a customer as he needs a correct
access-PIN to read the tag’s data.
• Replay attack: The intruder can eavesdrop on a session,
obtain M1 and M2 and resend the messages to the tag.
Then, the tag authenticates the intruder, changes its data
and sends M3. However, the proposed protocol utilises a
challenge-response scheme, where each party maintains a
set of random numbers it has seen from previous protocol
run to avoid repeatable random numbers.
In the retailer store, the attacker cannot replay the PIN
to the tag because it involves fresh random numbers. As
highlighted in the previous paragraph the tag maintains a
set of random numbers it has seen from previous protocol
run to avoid replay attack.
• Forward security: In the proposed protocol, the cases’ tag
is updated with new values (S, EPC-Case, C), which are
totally independent from its previous values.
• Mutual authentication: The proposed protocol allows the
distributor’s reader to access the tag and update the tag’s
data by sending authentication messages M1 and M2,
which confirm that the reader has successfully recovered
the secret key and has obtained the right value of (EPCi).
Similarly, the tag also sends M3, which confirms to the
reader that the legitimate tag has successfully changed the
values of Si, EPCi and Ci, which can only be obtained
by a legitimate tag.
Similarly, the reader in the retailer shop cannot access
the tag until it authenticates itself to the tag via sending
the correct access-PIN, which can only be obtained by
the legitimate reader (authenticated by the manufacturer).
Also, the tag is authenticated to the reader via the access-
PIN which is previously assigned by the manufacturer.
• Flexibility: In our model, any legitimate party in the
supply chain can generate new secret sharing parame-
ters (knew,nnew). Thus, a downstream party may choose
knew≤k and nnew≤n to process small cases of tags,
or choose knew≥k and nnew≥n to process large cases
of tags. Beside that, the distributer needs only to read
the cases’ tags for an identification purpose instead of
scanning thousands or millions of the products’ tags.
As shown in Table IV, Cai et al [6] has several issues that
this paper attempts to address.
VI. PARAMETERIZATION
In real-world implementation, the µ-Chip Hibiki tag can be
employed [9]. This kind of tags has the capability to lock
all the banks in the tag’s memory via utilising a PIN (called
access-PIN in this paper) to lock the tag’s memory.
An EPC tags memory is logically divided into four banks
namely, reserved memory for storing the kill and access pass-
words, UII memory for storing the EPC code, TID memory
for storing the tag identifier value, and user memory which
allows user-specific data storage.
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TABLE II
DISTRIBUTER SECRET KEY UPDATE PROCESS
Reader Tagi
[EPCi, Si, EPC-Casei, Ci]
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Successfullyrecoverthekey
1- Generates a random number R
2- Calculates KC ′=h(R)
3- Encrypts EPC-Case2i=EKC ′{EPCi}
4- Divides the new secret KC ′ into new n
shares
5- Generates a random number R1
6- Calculates M1= h(EPCi ⊕ EPC-Case2i
⊕ R1 ⊕ Ci) ⊕ Si′,
M2= h(Si′ ⊕ EPCi ⊕ R1) ⊕ Ci′
7- Sends M1, M2, EPC-Case2i and R1
M1,M2,EPC−Case2i,R1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 8- Calculates Si′=M1⊕ h(EPCi ⊕ EPC-
Case2i ⊕ R1 ⊕ Ci),
Ci′=M2 ⊕ h(Si′ ⊕ EPCi ⊕ R1)
9- Updates its values to:
Si ← Si′
EPC-Casei← EPC-Case2i
Ci← Ci′
10- Generates a random number R2
11- Calculates M3= h(EPCi ⊕ Si ⊕ Ci ⊕
R1 ⊕ R2)
12- Recalculates M3 M3,R2←−−−−−
Resynchronisation process:
1- Generates R3
2- Computes M4= h(EPCi ⊕ EPC-Case2i
⊕ R3) ⊕ Si′
M5= h(Si′ ⊕ EPCi ⊕ R3) ⊕ Ci′
Resynchronisationrequest,M4,M5,EPC−Case2i,R3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
3- Re-computes M4 and M5
4- If Si′ == Si, EPC-Case2 == EPC-Case
and Ci′ == Ci:
no update
else update:
Si ← Si′
EPC-Casei← EPC-Case2i
Ci← Ci′
5- Generates a random number R4
The process is iterated until the tag updates
its values successfully
M6,R4←−−−−− 6- Calculates M6= h(EPCi ⊕ Si ⊕ Ci ⊕
R3 ⊕ R4)
In the proposed scheme, the case’s tag stores four values
in a rewritable flash memory namely (EPC, S, EPC-Case, and
C). The size of each value is 144 bits length. The EPC value
is stored in the UII memory, and the values of (S, EPC-Case
and C) are stored in the user memory.
The good’s tag stores five variables namely (EPC, S, EPC-
Tag, access-PIN, and sequence) each of which is 144 bits
length. The access-PIN is stored in the reserved memory. The
EPC value is stored in the UII memory, and the S, EPC-Tag
and sequence values are stored in the user memory.
The designed scheme is compatible with µ-Chip Hibiki tag
chips that can store 272 bits in the EPC memory bank and
1536 bits in the user memory bank. Furthermore, additional
tag memory is necessary to store a list of random numbers re-
ceived from previous queries, for example by adding extended
on-chip non-volatile memory on the RFID tags.
Due to the limited computational power in the low cost
RFID tags, we propose to use the Keccak which has been
selected as the winner of the NIST SHA-3 competition in 2012
[10]. The design of the SHA-3 algorithm takes into account
the hardware implementation, so it has some properties of
lightweight hash function [11]. Kavun et al. [12] shows that
Keccak[400], which takes an input of size 144 bits, is suitable
for the RFID low cost tag. According to [12], the area of the
SHA-3 algorithm is around 5K gate equivalents (GE) which
confirms to the requirement of low-cost RFID tags (4-5K gates
for security modules).
Distributor scenario: We suppose there are a total of
100 cases (small numbers for more clarity). A manufacturer
randomly generates a 144 bits for instance, hashing it with
SHA-3, and then take the output as the secret key (KC) for the
cases. KC is then divided into 100 shares. The manufacturer
assigns exactly one share to each case. The manufacturer
employs, for example, a (80, 100) secret sharing threshold, so
the distributor needs to collect at least 80 shares to recover
the cases’ secret key. We chose the threshold to be 80 to
maximally tolerate (up to 20) reading errors.
Retailer scenario: Similarly, suppose we have 200 goods.
A manufacturer generates another random number 144 bits,
hashing it with SHA-3, and then takes the output as the secret
key (KT ) for the goods. KT is then divided into 200 shares.
The manufacturer assigns exactly one share to each good’s
tag. The distributor de-packs the goods and re-packs them
into smaller 80 goods and delivers them to retailer A, for
example. They employ a new (60, 80) secret sharing threshold,
so retailer A needs to collect at least 60 shares to recover the
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TABLE III
RETAILER KEY RECOVERY PROCESS
Reader Tagi
[EPCi, Si, EPC-Tagi, access-PINi, sequencei]
1- Generates a random number R1 R1−−→
2- Generates a random number R2
3- Retrieves the access-PIN based on sequencei
R2,sequencei←−−−−−−−−−
4- Calculates PIN=h(R1 ⊕ R2 ⊕ access-PIN)
PIN−−−→ 5- Confirms the correctness of the PIN
If the received PIN is correct, the tag calculates M1=
h(access-PIN ⊕ R1) ⊕ Si
6- Obtains Si by calculating M1 ⊕ h(access-PIN ⊕ R1) M1,EPC−Tagi←−−−−−−−−−−−
7-Collects k' shares to recover KT
8- Decrypts EPC-Tagi based on the recovered KT
9- Retrieves EPCi for every ith tag
TABLE IV
SECURITY FEATURES COMPARISON
Cai et al [6] Section IV
Reader impersonation √ √
Tag impersonation √ √
Desynchronisation attack × √
Tag information privacy √ √
Untraceability × √
Replay attack × √
Forward security √ √
Mutual authentication × √
Goods’ tag access control √ √
Flexibility √ √
goods’ secret key.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an improved version of a key
distribution and recovery model in the RFID-enabled supply
chain. Firstly, our scheme distributes the secret key securely
in the RFID-enabled supply chain via deploying the secret
sharing approach. Secondly, it updates the secret key after each
successful key recovery, and thus eliminates the threats asso-
ciated with location tracking. Thirdly, the proposed protocol
avoids replay attack using fresh random numbers generated by
the reader and tags. Fourthly, to counter the disruptive effects
of desynchronisation attacks, the protocol has a resynchronisa-
tion phase that is initiated by the reader whenever it suspects a
desynchronisation with the tag. Fourthly, the proposed scheme
permits the distributor to change the threshold based on the
dispatched items, also it facilitates the tags identification
process for the distributer. Finally, the proposed protocol meets
the main requirements of the low cost RFID tags in terms of
storage and computational costs.
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